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1. We are writing in response to the UK Government consultation in respect of the proposals to 
modify the Human Medicine Regulations 2012 (“the Regulations”) in order to support the rollout 
of a COVID-19 vaccine.  
 
2. This is a submission to the consultation on behalf of a group of specialists drawn from different 
disciplines setting out our views on the proposed changes.  
   
3. Under the proposed modification of the Regulations, the envisaged scenario is that if there is a 
compelling case on public health grounds for using a vaccine before it is given a product licence, 
the Joint Committee on Vaccination and Immunisation may take the step of advising the UK 
government to use a tested, unlicensed vaccine/s against COVID-19.  
 
4. This would be a highly unusual step to take, and we have concerns about any UK Government 
decision to resort to the supply of an unlicensed medicinal product in this manner and the public 
health messaging that is thereby relayed. This is particularly the case in respect of one or several 
vaccines which have been developed under a fast-track procedure, potentially based on 
innovative technology, and which is to be used on such a wide scale to the general population.   
 
5. Such an approach is problematic in light of the critical issue of the acceptability of 
vaccines. Vaccines are biological and social technologies. To curb the spread of a disease at the 
population level, they have to stimulate an effective immune response and be taken up by a 
sufficient percentage of the population to interrupt transmission.  Recent years have seen a rise 
of vaccine hesitancy around the world and the WHO has named vaccine hesitancy as one of the 
top 10 global health threats. A study published of vaccine hesitancy in 149 countries from 2015-
2019 found low levels of vaccine confidence in Europe in comparison to other regions (Larson 
et al, 2020). Combined with the rise of disinformation campaigns and the early release of 
untested COVID-19 vaccines by other states, there is significant potential for lack of public trust 
to undermine the uptake of a COVID-19 vaccine.  Historical precedents like the 1976 swine flu 
campaign in the US, which was stopped after the detection of cases of Guillain Barré syndrome, 
show that fast-tracked licensing and vaccine rollouts can undermine trust not only in one 
vaccine but in the wider regulatory establishment licensing them.  
 
6. It is also unclear how public opinion may be affected by the potential emergency licensing of 
multiple vaccine candidates with different safety, cost, and efficacy profiles. Between 1955 and 
1961, the parallel development of two polio vaccine platforms (Salk - inactivated; Sabin - 
attenuated) with tests conducted on both sides of the Iron Curtain (Conis, 2015; Vargha, 2018) 
resulted in a degree of confusion and uncertainty. While Sabin’s oral polio vaccines 
(OPV) remained in use in many low-income countries due to its low costs and mode of action, 
it was implicated in the spread of new vaccine-derived poliovirus (since 2012 its use has been 
phased out). Communicating why some people may have access to a safer but perhaps more 
expensive emergency vaccine and why others will not have such access could potentially pose a 
major public health and relations challenge in the likely event of multiple COVID-19 vaccine 
candidates being developed in parallel.   
 
7. A third significant issue which regulators will face is to ensure high standards of vaccine 
manufacturing and public trust in resulting products. In 1955, trust in the safety of the Salk 
vaccine was negatively affected by the so-called Cutter incident when manufacturing and 
inspection failures on the part of the Cutter pharmaceutical company resulted in the spread of 
live virus. The unprecedented global scale of any COVID-19 rollout poses unique challenges in 
terms of guaranteeing safe manufacturing standards around the world. Depending on which 
vaccine candidate is licensed first, the UK government will likely have to rely on a mix of vaccine 
doses produced at home and imported from abroad. Creating trust in imports that have been 
licensed according to emergency rules will be challenging. Maintaining trust following likely 
reports of limited adverse events will be even more complicated and may depend on being able 
to hold individual companies to account.  
 
8. Having an up to date vaccination status is a professional obligation for registered health care 
professionals, and employers or service providers may also require vaccination for certain 
groups of employees or service users. This means that COVID-19 vaccination may in practice 
become mandatory for some groups. This needs to be taken into account when considering the 




Use of the temporary authorisation procedure 
  
9. The use of the temporary authorisation procedure under Regulation 174 of the Regulations, 
rather than seeking to license the vaccine through ordinary market authorisation route, has the 
potential to undermine public confidence in a COVID-19 vaccine. As noted above, there is 
already considerable public sensitivity vis-à-vis the development of such an emergency 
vaccine. It is our view that the use of the temporary authorisation procedure of an unlicensed 
product, coupled with the accompanying immunity from liability of manufacturers and others 
(see below) has the potential to undermine public trust, which is a very precious commodity in 
the current pandemic. That may affect the ultimate take up of the vaccine. It is our view that 
strong preference should be given for the ordinary market authorisation route which, even 
though it may require greater time for the full clinical trial to be undertaken, and the usual 
authorisation to be completed, will be more likely to attract public confidence and acceptability 
of the resultant vaccine.  
 
 
Civil liability and immunity 
  
10. The provisions of the Regulations regarding civil liability also raise issues in respect of 
the acceptability of vaccines. 
 
11. It is indeed correct that the current Article 5(3) of Directive 2001/83 requires Member States to 
lay down provisions so that marketing authorisation holders, manufacturers and health 
professionals are not subject to civil or administrative liability for any consequences resulting 
from the use of an unauthorised medicinal product, or from the use of a product otherwise than 
in accordance with its authorisation, when such use is by the licensing authority in response to 
(among other things) the spread of pathogens. This has been transposed into UK law by virtue 
of Regulation 345(3) of the Regulations. 
 
12. We are of the view that there are reasons to question whether such an immunity is advisable in 
the current circumstances. 
  
13. The immunity in Regulation 345 is not absolute. As noted in the consultation document, 
Regulation 345 does not provide complete immunity from civil liability. Regulation 345(4) thus 
provides for a carve-out in terms of product liability under the Consumer Protection Act 1987 
(hereinafter “CPA.”). It is thus stated that there is no immunity in relation to a claim under 
section 2 of the CPA. 
  
14. A consequence of this is that there is in effect a channelling of liability towards the cause of 
action under the Consumer Protection Act. The specific regime applicable to clinical trials of 
medicinal products which would normally apply to the period before a medical product is 
granted a licence in the UK, is inapplicable in the current circumstances given the temporary 
authorisation. The immunity under Regulation 345(3) moreover results in an exclusion of claims 
under the orthodox common law causes of action of contract, tort and breach of statutory duty. 
It is uncertain at this stage whether the statutory compensation scheme under the Vaccine 
Damage Payments Act 1979 would be applicable or not (as COVID-19 would need to be added 
as a specified disease in respect of the scheme). We note also that that there is no statutory 
exception in case of intentionally caused harm or egregious fault as is often the case for 
statutory immunities,1 albeit it is proposed in the consultation that the immunity should not 
apply where the supply is materially inconsistent with the terms of the licensing authority’s 
approval (see further below).   
  
15. As a result, great emphasis is placed upon the product liability regime pursuant to the Consumer 
Protection Act 1987. Restrictions on time and space prevent us from reviewing this regime in 
detail here. Two points will however be made. First, liability under these provisions requires 
proof by the claimant that the product was defective, that damage was sustained by the 
claimant, and that this damage was caused by defect. Making out these elements can often be 
challenging, and that may be particularly difficult where the product in question is a medicine. 
Secondly, it is also to be noted that the success rate of actions under the CPA has not been high, 
particularly in group actions concerning medicines and medical devices where claims have failed 
on defect and causation grounds. The development risks defence under the CPA (which does 
not require a finding of negligence) may still pose significant problems for a claimant as it 
enables a manufacturer to rely on the fact that the objective state of scientific and technical 
knowledge, at the time the vaccine was put into circulation, was not such as to enable the 
 
1 See for example in the financial services sector :  Sch 1, s 19(1) of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 
(as originally enacted); Banking Act 1987, s 1(4).  
existence of the defect to be discovered. Indeed, the current position as regards medicines has 
been subject to criticism in the recently published Report of the Independent Medicines and 
Medical Devices Safety Review led by Baroness Cumberlege:2 
 
To date, litigation has not served the patient groups we have met well. In the 
future a more equitable way to deliver redress that truly works for patients must 
be developed. Even the best pre-market testing will not capture all adverse 
events that may occur in real world treatment with pharmaceuticals and medical 
devices. Individuals may be harmed by new products in ways that were not 
foreseen during development and testing. We must establish an effective redress 
mechanism for those who suffer avoidable harm or unforeseen drug or device 
injury.       
  
16. In light of the foregoing, the route to compensation in case of harm deriving from a COVID-19 
vaccine/s under the Regulations is likely to be a challenging one. We are concerned that this 
might be seen by the public as being unjustifiably restrictive in respect of those impacted by 
adverse events / side effects of the products in question. This has the potential of undermining 
public confidence in the COVID-19 vaccine process, which would almost inevitably impact on 
the take up of any vaccine/s and thus impede its effectiveness. This would be an unfortunate 
position, and would actually be counter-productive in terms of the overall public health 
objectives for the roll out process of a COVID-19 vaccine. 
 
17. The final issue is whether, having taken account of these considerations, if the immunity 
contained in Regulation 345 is nonetheless maintained (contrary to the considerations set out 
above), there are justifications for the extension of the immunity to pharmaceutical companies 
which are responsible for placing unlicensed products on the market on the same footing as 
manufacturers of unlicensed products and the same footing as marketing authorisation holders 
of products which the licensing authority recommends are used otherwise than in accordance 
with their authorisation. Our view is that such an approach has some justification in the sense 
that liability of the supplier under the CPA regime mentioned above is subsidiary, with the 
primary liability being attached to the producer, and thus it would make sense for the supplier 
not to be in a less favourable position in respect of liability in tort or contract.   
 




When the Protection is lost 
18. It is indicated in the consultation that the immunity contained in Regulation 345 should not 
apply where the supply is materially inconsistent with the terms of the licensing authority’s 
approval, and that legal recourse is thus possible in such circumstances. This position is reflected 
in draft Regulation 174A(3)(b).      
  
19. In our view, the proposed approach to this issue in the draft regulations is problematic. First, 
the application of a nuanced objective test to the question of whether the protection of the 
immunity should be forfeited or not seems extremely complex. It should be noted that even if 
an immunity is removed for a technical or minor breach, any claimant will still need to make out 
the elements of a standard cause of action, such as the tort of negligence. For a claim in 
negligence, the claimant will in effect need to show negligence of the defendant manufacturer 
/ supplier - not at all easy to make out in terms of mere technical breach. Moreover, causation 
would surely be difficult to prove when there is a "breach of a technical requirement with a 
relatively inconsequential effect." In our view, it would be simpler for the immunity to be 
removed if the supply does not "materially comply" with the licensing authority's 
recommendation.  
 
20. If however, despite the aforementioned, an objective test is adopted, we would express a 
preference for the simplest approach (ie reference solely to a "reasonable person") and for it to 
be left to the courts to determine whether any specific knowledge is imputed to the "reasonable 
person" (the courts are well-used to doing this in other areas of the law).  
 
21. Second, Regulation 174A(3)(b) sets out that “any risk of death or personal injury that is wholly 
or partly attributable to that breach is such that a reasonable person [with an interest in placing 
medicinal products on the market] would regard the breach as sufficiently serious to justify the 
licencing authority setting aside the recommendation or requirement.” The relevance of the 
latter part of this test (underlined) is uncertain as it is not the recommendation that is in doubt, 
but the rather the supply which is inconsistent with the terms of the licensing authority’s 
approval.   
 
 
Compensation for Vaccine Damage 
 
22. In light of the restricted avenues to compensation, we consider that there are strong arguments 
in favour of the creation of a bespoke regime for compensation for those who suffer injury 
caused by a COVID-19 vaccine. This is justified by the particular circumstances of the current 
pandemic, including the expedited regulatory process, the use of novel vaccine technology, 
potential mandatory nature of the vaccine for some persons, and the imperative need to 
reinforce public trust in COVID-19 vaccine and ensure high take up of any such vaccine/s. 
 
23. Such a bespoke compensation scheme should be designed to provide adequate redress for the 
loss caused, going beyond that which is provide by the current vaccine damage scheme under 
the Vaccine Damage Payments Act 1979. Such a bespoke scheme for harm caused by COVID-19 
vaccines would be in line with the no-fault redress schemes recommended by the 
aforementioned Report of the Independent Medicines and Medical Devices Safety Review, and 
could thus fall within the purview of the proposed Redress Agency. 
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